Once a Trojan...

is that it has to do with the potential penalty. Something that could put you in the slammer for a year is a felony, less than a year is a misdemeanor. How a prosecutor makes that decision is beyond me.

I looked up “wobblers” on the internet and found lots of things, most of which were someone’s work product and not quotable. I also found a copy of Ewing v. Califonria, a 2003 Supreme Court opinion. (No citation was included, so if you’re interested, you’ll have to look it up yourself. Here is a quote about wobblers that probably will leave you as confused as ever:

“Under California law, certain offenses may be classified as either felonies or misdemeanors. These crimes are known as "wobblers.” Some crimes that would otherwise be misdemeanors become “wobblers” because of the defendant’s prior record. For example, petty theft, a misdemeanor, becomes a “wobbler” when the defendant has previously served a prison term for committing specified theft-related crimes. §490 (West 1999); §666 (West Supp. 2002). Other crimes, such as grand theft, are “wobblers” regardless of the defendant’s prior record. See §489(b) (West 1999). Both types of “wobblers” are triggering offenses under the three strikes law only when they are treated as felonies. Under California law, a “wobbler” is presumptively a felony and “remains a felony except when the discretion is actually exercised” to make the crime a misdemeanor. People v. Williams, 27 Cal. 2d 220, 229, 163 P. 2d 692, 696 (1945) (emphasis deleted and internal quotation marks omitted).

     In California, prosecutors may exercise their discretion to charge a “wobbler” as either a felony or a misdemeanor. Likewise, California trial courts have discretion to reduce a “wobbler” charged as a felony to a misdemeanor either before preliminary examination or at sentencing to avoid imposing a three strikes sentence. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§17(b)(5), 17(b)(1) (West 1999); People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty. ex rel. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 968, 978, 928 P. 2d 1171, 1177-1178 (1997). In exercising this discretion, the court may consider “those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions,” such as “the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, . . . [and] the general objectives of sentencing.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)."